基于动态博弈的政府与中小企业技术创新行为分析

The Analysis of Technology Innovation Between Government and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Based on Dynamic Game

摘要:

从博弈论角度，分析了中小企业技术创新过程中企业与政府之间存在着完全但不完美信息动态博弈行为，结果表明政府对有创新能力的企业给予资金扶持，同时企业采取技术创新活动可以实现企业与政府的双赢结果，这也有助于解释各国政府对中小企业技术创新的资金扶持；同时也进一步从理论上解释了中小企业技术创新的理性.

Abstract:

In this paper， from the angel of game theory， complete but imperfect information dynamic game between small and medium-sized enterprises and government is analyzed in the process of technology innovation in small and medium-sized enterprises. The result shows that both of the government and the enterprises can be better off while the government finances the enterprises and the enterprises implement technology innovation， It can explain why the government supports the enterprises； and it can also explain the enterprises' rational actions of technology innovation.