基于定制化创新努力的自有品牌引入决策研究

Research on Decision-making of Store Brand Introduction Based on Power Structure Differences and Customization Innovation Efforts

摘要:

传统零售商自有品牌不同，电商平台拥有海量的消费者数据，其利用大数据资源和创新技术在开发设计自有品牌时进行定制化创新努力。然而权力结构差异和电定制化努力对电商自有品牌引入决策的影响尚不清晰。利用Stackelberg博弈建立不引入自有品牌、强势电商引入自有品牌、弱势电商引入自有品牌三种情形的博弈模型。研究发现：第一，电商平台引入自有品牌的条件是自有品牌潜在需求系数和创新技术成本效率高于一定值，且弱势电商平台引入自有品牌的“门槛”更高；第二，电商平台引入自有品牌在一定参数条件下可以提高制造商和渠道整体利润，其中对于制造商来说，强势电商引入自有品牌对制造商更有利，而从渠道整体来看，当品牌间替代程度较低，弱势电商平台引入自有品牌更有利。

Abstract:

Different from traditional retailer store brand, online retailers, have accumulated a large amount of consumer data in the sales process, who can make use of big data resources to make customized efforts in the development store brands. However, how does the power structure differences and customization efforts impact the decision-making of e-commerce store brand introduction is still unclear. This paper uses the Stackelberg game theory to establish three kinds of game situations: not introducing store brands, strong e-commerce platforms introducing store brands, weak e-commerce platforms introducing store brands. By comparing the price, demand and profit of three scenarios, this paper finds that: first, the conditions for e-commerce platforms to introduce store brands are that the potential demand coefficient of store brands and the cost efficiency of customized technology are higher than a certain value, and the threshold for weak e-commerce platforms to introduce store brands is higher. Second, the introduction of e-commerce store brands can improve the profits of manufacturers and channels under certain parameters. For manufacturers, the introduction of store brands by strong e-commerce platforms is more favorable, while from the perspective of the whole channel, the introduction of store brands by weak e-commerce platforms is more favorable with a low substitution degree between brands.