投资阻塞问题的理论研究——兼论资源配置效率问题

A Theoretical Study of the Hold-up Problem：Discussion on the Efficiency of Resource Allocation

摘要:

套牢问题产生的条件及应用范围是什么? 学界观点尚不统一。本文基于外包情形构建理论模型,通过推导给出了套牢问题的产生条件:要素无法获得所有边际报酬且契约不完备同时具备时产生套牢问题。满足该条件时,中间产品厂商将减少契约未规定部分生产活动的投资量,最终产品厂商为了避免投资不足产出下降将要求契约规定部分过度投资,呈现投资扭曲。随后,进一步探究了套牢问题背后的经济规律,引入广义外部性阐释了其影响可变要素投入或产出水平决策等问题时呈现的一般性规律,以及广义外部性与帕累托最优之间的关系。最后,揭示了广义外部性相关的套牢问题呈现在模型中的设定规律,研究不仅有利于厘清套牢问题的应用范围,也强调了实证研究中选取理论模型不应局限于结论,也应关注假定与结论之间逻辑关系反映的作用机制与现实的匹配程度。

Abstract:

What are the conditions and scope of application for the hold-up problem? Academic views are not unified. A theoretical model based on outsourcing situation was constructed and deduces the conditions of the hold up problem: when the factors cannot obtain all marginal returns and the contract is incomplete at the same time, the hold up problem arises. When this condition is met, intermediate product manufacturers will reduce the investment in production activities not specified in the contract. Final product manufacturers will require over investment in the contracted parts to avoid output decline due to underinvestment, resulting in investment distortion. Subsequently, the article further explores the economic laws behind the hold up problem, creatively introduces broad externality to explain the general laws that arise when it affects decision-making on variable factor input or output levels, and explains the relationship between broad externality and Pareto optimality. Finally, the paper reveals the setting rules of hold up problem related to broad externality in the model, emphasizing that the judgment of theoretical models should not be limited to conclusions, but should also focus on whether the mechanism corresponding to assumptions and conclusions match reality.