异质复杂网络下产业共性技术创新扩散的两阶段博弈分析

Two-Stage Game Analysis of Industrial General Purpose Technology Innovation Diffusion Based on Heterogeneous Complex Networks

摘要:

基于演化博弈理论和复杂网络理论,构建产业共性技术创新扩散的演化博弈模型,系统分析其在企业群体间二次开发及在消费者群体间附随产品购买两个阶段的扩散机制。模型考虑扩散群体的异质性复杂网络拓扑特征,涵盖博弈主体、演化规则和网络结构三要素,旨在刻画技术在供给侧和需求侧的扩散路径,并探索政府在产业共性技术创新扩散两阶段中的最优激励策略。研究发现:政府补贴对产业共性技术创新扩散具有倒 U 型激励效应,过高或过低的补贴力度均削弱资源配置效率;边缘企业比核心企业更关注共性技术二次开发后的技术成熟度和政府补贴力度;在消费者群体间的扩散遵循价格机制,降低技术附随产品价格及提升其技术成熟度有助于市场渗透;共性技术创新扩散稳定性受群体网络结构影响显著,降低技术成本或产品价格有助于提升扩散稳定性。研究揭示了产业共性技术扩散的多主体协同机制与政策激励的边界效应,为政府优化政策工具、提升共性技术推广效率提供理论支撑。

Abstract:

An evolutionary game model was constructed based on evolutionary game theory and complex network theory to analyze the two-stage diffusion mechanism of industrial general purpose technologies ( GPTs): secondary development among enterprise groups and complementary product purchases among consumer groups. The model incorporated the heterogeneity and complex network topology of diffusion groups and included three elements: game subjects, evolution rules, and network structures. The diffusion paths on the supply side and demand side were depicted, and the optimal government incentive strategies in the two diffusion stages were explored. The results show that the incentive effect of government subsidies on the diffusion of industrial GPTs follows an inverted U-shaped trend. Both excessive and insufficient subsidies reduce resource allocation efficiency. Peripheral enterprises are more concerned than core enterprises with the technical maturity after secondary development and the intensity of government subsidies. Consumer diffusion follows price-based mechanisms. Lowering the price of complementary products and improving their technical maturity significantly promote market penetration. In addition, the stability of GPT diffusion is significantly influenced by the network structure of diffusion groups. Reducing innovation costs or product prices helps enhance the stability of industrial GPT diffusion. These findings reveal the multi-agent coordination mechanism and the boundary effect of policy incentives in the diffusion of industrial GPTs and provide theoretical support for optimizing policy tools and improving diffusion efficiency.