质量信号对食用农产品市场逆向选择的影响及机制研究

Research on the Impact and Mechanism of Quality Signal on Adverse Selection in Edible Agricultural Product Market

摘要:

买卖主体之间信息不对称加剧了食用农产品市场的逆向选择,其根源是食用农产品具有显著的信任品特征,导致消费者在使用后仍然难以直接判断其质量等级。本文在理论上阐述了产品质量信号对逆向选择的作用及影响机制,进一步通过典型食用农产品细分市场——茶产品市场的调研数据进行实证检验。结果发现,促进产品质量信号释放能缓解信息不对称导致的逆向选择,且外部质量信号的影响强度高于内部质量信号;同时,市场活跃度和信息匹配效率作为调节变量,会影响产品质量信号释放对逆向选择作用的强度。因此,需要企业。第三方机构及政府相关部门多方协作推进食用农产品内外部质量信号的有效释放,完善产品质量信息建设和披露体系,进而缓解市场逆向选择,促进食用农产品全国统一大市场的形成。

Abstract:

The information asymmetry between buyers and sellers exacerbates adverse selection in the edible agricultural products market. The fundamental cause is that edible agricultural products have significant characteristics of credence goods, which makes it difficult for consumers to directly judge their quality grades even after using. The role and mechanism of product quality signals on adverse selection were theoretically elaborated. Furthermore, an empirical study was conducted to test the hypothesis using survey data from the tea products market which is a typical edible agricultural market segment. The results showed that promoting the release of product quality signals mitigated adverse selection due to information asymmetry. The intensity of the effect of external quality signals was higher than that of internal quality signals. In the meantime, moderators which are market activity and information matching efficiency, would affect the strength of the effect of product quality signals release on adverse selection. Therefore, it is necessary for enterprises, third-party institutions and relevant government departments to collaborate to promote the effective release of internal and external quality signals of edible agricultural products, improve the construction and disclosure system of product quality information, thereby alleviating the adverse selection and promoting the formation of a unified national market for edible agricultural products.