地方政府债务与企业异地投资——基于“挤占”和“拉动”双重机制

Local Government Debt and Enterprise Cross Regional Investment ——Based on the Dual Mechanism of ‘Crowding Out’ and ‘Pulling’

摘要:

厘清地方财政与实体经济之间的动态关联，是防范和化解宏观债务风险的重要前提。本文利用2015—2023年城市层面的政府债务数据实证检验了地方政府债务对上市公司异地投资的影响效应及作用机理。结果发现，地方政府债务增长显著抑制了企业异地投资行为。作用机制存在“挤占”与“拉动”两种效应：一方面，地方政府债务通过金融资源挤占削弱企业异地投资能力，产生异地投资“挤占效应”；另一方面，地方政府债务通过基础设施建设增强企业本地发展粘性，产生本地投资“拉动效应”。异质性分析发现，地方政府债务对企业异地投资的抑制作用在国有企业、制造业企业和注册地位于二线及以下城市样本中更显著。研究为当前化解地方债务风险、畅通国内大循环以及构建新发展格局提供了理论依据与政策启示。

Abstract:

Clarifying the dynamic relationship between local finance and the real economy is an important prerequisite for preventing and resolving macro debt risks. Using government debt data at the city level from 2015 to 2023, the impact of local government debt on cross-regional investment by listed companies and its underlying mechanisms were empirically examined. The results showed that the growth of local government debt significantly suppressed the behavior of enterprises investing in other places. Two distinct mechanisms are identified: ‘crowding out’ and ‘pulling’. On the one hand, local government debt weakens the ability of enterprises to invest in other places through the crowding out of financial resources, resulting in a ‘crowding out effect’ of investing in other places; On the other hand, local government debt enhances the local development stickiness of enterprises through infrastructure construction, generating a ‘pull effect’ on local investment. Heterogeneity analysis found that the inhibitory effect of local government debt on enterprises' out of town investment is more significant in samples of state-owned enterprises, manufacturing industries, and cities registered in the second tier or below. Based on these findings, a theoretical foundation and policy insights are provided for mitigating local debt risks, facilitating internal economic circulation, and advancing the establishment of a new development framework.