战略性新兴产业信贷贴息政策模拟研究——基于DSGE模型的内外生机制对比与利润分成优化

Credit Interest Subsidy Mechanism Design and Effect Analysis for Strategic Emerging Industries: A DSGE Model Based on Heterogeneous Firm Financing Constraints and Profit Sharing

摘要:

在技术创新和产业政策实践快速发展的背景下，信贷贴息如何更有效缓解战略性新兴产业的融资约束，是建设我国现代化产业体系面临的重要问题。本文通过构建一个包含异质性企业融资约束和利润分成的DSGE模型，分析外生型和内生型信贷贴息政策机制的差异化作用路径及其效果，主要贡献在于突破了既有文献关注外生型贴息与静态效应的局限，创新性地将利润分成机制与信贷贴息的内生联动机制纳入分析框架，构建了“技术进步—利润增长—贴息扩大—产业发展”的良性循环机制。研究发现，“贴息－信贷规模”动态挂钩的内生型贴息可通过“自动稳定器”功能将战新产业技术进步对传统产业的挤出效应显著降低，证实了政策设计从“固定补贴”转向“动态调节”的宏观必要性；信贷贴息存在“强度悖论”，过度贴息会通过财政负反馈循环削弱长期效果，为寻找政策效果最大化的最优强度边界提供了依据；通过将国企利润分成机制内化为贴息资金来源，形成了“技术进步－财政增收－贴息可持续”的政策循环，并通过分阶段动态调整利润分成比例，有效破解了短期激励与长期可持续性的两难困境。

Abstract:

Against the backdrop of rapid developments in technological innovation and industrial policy practices, effectively mitigating financing constraints for strategic emerging industries (SEIs) through credit interest subsidies constitutes a critical challenge in building China's modern industrial system. This paper constructs a DSGE model incorporating heterogeneous firm financing constraints and profit-sharing to analyze the differentiated pathways and effects of exogenous versus endogenous credit interest subsidy policy mechanisms. Its primary contribution lies in transcending the limitations of existing literature focused on exogenous subsidies and static effects by innovatively integrating the profit-sharing mechanism and the endogenous linkage mechanism of credit subsidies into the analytical framework, thereby establishing a virtuous cycle mechanism of 'technological progress-profit growth-subsidy expansion-industrial development'. The research finds that endogenous subsidies dynamically linked to credit scale can significantly reduce the crowding-out effect of SEI technological advancement on traditional industries through an 'automatic stabilizer' function, confirming the macroeconomic necessity of shifting policy design from 'fixed subsidies' to 'dynamic adjustments'; a credit subsidy 'intensity paradox' exists, where excessive subsidies weaken long-term effectiveness via a fiscal negative feedback loop, providing quantitative justification for identifying the optimal intensity threshold that maximizes policy effectiveness; and by internalizing the state-owned enterprise profit-sharing mechanism as a funding source for subsidies, a 'technological progress-fiscal revenue growth-subsidy sustainability' policy cycle is formed, effectively resolving the genuine dilemma between short-term incentives and long-term sustainability through phased dynamic adjustments to the profit-sharing ratio.