战略性新兴产业信贷贴息政策模拟研究——基于DSGE模型的内外生机制对比与利润分成优化

Modeling Credit Interest Subsidy Policies for Strategic Emerging Industries : Contrasting Exogenous vs.Endogenous Mechanisms and Profit-Sharing Optimization Based on a DSGE Framework

摘要:

在技术创新和产业政策实践快速发展的背景下,信贷贴息如何更有效缓解战略性新兴产业的融资约束,是建设中国现代化产业体系面临的重要问题。创新性地将利润分成机制与信贷贴息的内生联动机制纳入DSGE分析框架,通过构建一个包含异质性企业融资约束和利润分成的DSGE 模型,分析外生型和内生型信贷贴息政策机制的差异化作用路径及其效果。研究发现,“贴息-信贷规模”动态关联的内生型贴息机制,通过触发自动稳定器功能,能够显著降低战略性新兴产业技术进步对传统产业的挤出效应,证实了政策设计从固定比例转向精准动态调节的必要性;信贷贴息存在“强度悖论”,过度贴息会通过财政负反馈循环削弱长期效果,为寻找政策效果最优提供了强度边界的量化依据;通过将国企利润分成机制内化为贴息资金来源,形成了“技术进步→利润增长→财政增收→贴息扩大→产业发展→贴息可持续”的良性循环机制,并通过分阶段动态调整利润分成比例,有效破解了短期激励与长期可持续性的两难困境。研究回应了中国信贷配置的“产业错配”与“主体错配”矛盾,并提出了构建利润分成动态调整和“贴息-信贷规模”挂钩机制的政策建议,为优化信贷配置、破解战新产业融资困局、促进产业协同提供了方案。

Abstract:

Rapid developments in technological innovation and industrial policy practices are observed globally. How credit interest subsidies can more effectively alleviate the financing constraints of strategic emerging industries (SEIs) is recognized as a critical issue in building China's modern industrial system. A profit-sharing mechanism and an endogenous linkage mechanism of credit interest subsidies were innovatively incorporated into a DSGE analytical framework. A DSGE model was constructed to include heterogeneous firm financing constraints and profit sharing. The differentiated pathways and effects of exogenous versus endogenous credit interest subsidy policy mechanisms were analyzed. It is found that the endogenous subsidy mechanism with dynamic linkage between“interest subsidy and credit scale” can significantly reduce the crowding-out effect of SEI technological progress on traditional industries by triggering an automatic stabilizer function. The necessity of shifting policy design from fixed ratios to precise dynamic adjustments is thus confirmed. An“intensity paradox” is identified in credit interest subsidies , whereby excessive subsidies weaken long-term effectiveness through fiscal negative feedback loops. Quantitative evidence is provided for identifying the optimal intensity boundary for policy effectiveness. The state-owned enterprise profit-sharing mechanism is internalized as a funding source for interest subsidies. A virtuous cycle of“technological progress→profit growth→fiscal revenue increase→subsidy expansion→industrial development → subsidy sustainability” is thereby established. Through phased dynamic adjustments of profit-sharing ratios , the dilemma between short-term incentives and long-term sustainability is effectively resolved. It addresses the“industrial misallocation” and“entity misallocation” contradictions in China's credit allocation , and puts forward policy recommendations to construct a dynamically adjusted profit sharing mechanism and a linkage mechanism between“interest subsidy and credit scale” , providing a solution for optimizing credit allocation , resolving the financing dilemma of strategic emerging industries , and promoting industrial synergy.